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Introduction
The	people	of	Ghana	are	gearing	themselves	up	for	general	elections	
in	December	00.	Election	00	would	be	a	historic	fifth	consecutive	
national	poll	since	the	start	of	the	current	constitutional	democratic	
dispensation	 in	 99.	 The	 transitional	 presidential	 election	 of	Nov-
ember	99	was	highly	disputed	by	the	opposition	parties	leading	to	
their	boycott	of	the	subsequent	parliamentary	poll	that	December.	The	
acrimony	no	doubt	had	arisen	from	the	fact	that	the	outgoing	military	
regime	that	had	metamorphosed	into	a	political	party	to	contest	that	
election	was	perceived	to	have	rigged	elections.
It	was	from	such	shaky	foundation	that	Ghana’s	current	dispensa-
tion	has	blossomed.	The	subsequent	elections	(996,	004,	and	004)	
have	been	more	peaceful	and	generally	 free	and	fair.	 In	000,	 there	
was	a	peaceful	alternation	of	power	from	the	ruling	National	Demo-
cratic	Congress	(NDC)	to	the	opposition	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP).	
Ghana’s	electoral	successes	have	made	it	a	paragon	of	good	governan-
ce	and	peaceful	coexistence	in	the	West	African	sub-region	which	over	
the	last	decade	and	half	has	been	better	known	for	a	spiral	of	violent	
conflict	(Frempong	006:	57).
How	can	 this	apparent	paradox,	a	flawed	 transition	 setting	 the	
stage	for	democratic	progress,	be	explained?	Ghana,	despite	the	emer-
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ging	culture	of	political	stability,	still	faces	a	number	of	challenges	–	
abuse	of	incumbency,	ethnicity,	and	overdependence	on	donor	inflow;	
but	in	its	successes	and	challenges,	several	lessons	can	be	distilled	for	
the	rest	of	Africa	and	indeed	the	entire	South.
Issues of democracy and elections
Democracy,	particularly,	its	liberal	version,	may	be	defined	as	“a	sys-
tem	of	governance	in	which	rulers	are	held	accountable	for	their	ac-
tions	in	the	public	realms	of	citizens,	acting	indirectly	through	com-
petition	 and	 cooperation	 of	 their	 elected	 representatives	 (Diamond	
and	Plattner	999:	xi).	This	implies	extensive	competition	for	power;	
highly	inclusive	citizenship	and	extensive	civil	and	political	liberties.	
Also,	 in-between	elections,	citizens	must	be	able	to	 influence	public	
policy	through	various	non-electoral means	like	interest	group	asso-
ciations	and	social	movements,	which	invariably	involve	cooperation	
and	competition	among	citizens	(Ibid).
In	 a	 democracy,	 a	 balance	must	 be	 found	 between	 competing	
values;	and	political	actors	must	cooperate	 in	order	 to	compete.	To	
be	effective	and	stable,	there	must	be	the	belief	 in	the	legitimacy	of	
democracy,	tolerance	for	opposition	parties,	a	willingness	to	compro-
mise	with	political	opponents,	pragmatism	and	flexibility,	trust	in	the	
political	environment,	cooperation	among	political	competitors,	mo-
deration	in	political	positions	and	partisan	identifications,	civility	of	
political	discourse	and	efficacy	and	participation	based	on	the	princi-
ples	of	political	equality	(Diamond	et	al	995:9).	Coalition	building	
therefore	becomes	an	essential	component	of	democratic	actions.	It	
teaches	interest	groups	to	negotiate	with	others,	to	compromise	and	
to	work	within	the	constitutional	system.	By	so	doing	groups	with	di-
fferences	learn	how	to	argue	peaceably,	how	to	pursue	their	goals	in	a	
democratic	manner	and	ultimately	how	to	live	in	a	world	of	diversity.
Democracy	is	embedded	in	a	complex	architecture	of	norms	whi-
ch	is	embodied	in,	and	implemented	by,	an	ensemble	of	institutions	
including	the	multiparty	system,	an	independent	judiciary,	free	press,	
and	an	electoral	 system.	The	 stability	of	 a	democratic	order	 in	any	
country	is	ultimately	determined	by	the	extent	to	which	such	institu-
tions	are	able	to	function	in	a	sustainable	manner	(Ninsin	006:	59).
Elections	 are	 a	major	 institutional	 pillar	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	
They	 provide	 the	 platform	 for	 exercising	 the	 core	 rights	 associated	
with	democracy	–	freedom	of	speech,	association,	choice	and	move-
ment.	They	are	also	an	expression	of	the	right	of	participation	in	the	
political	 process.	 For	 the	masses	 they	 are	 the	 opportunity	 to	make	
the	political	leaders	accountable	for	their	stewardship	during	the	time	
they	were	in	power,	as	well	as	subject	to	their	power	as	the	final	sove-
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reign	of	the	country.	The	political	class	sees	them	as	an	opportunity	
for	renewing	their	mandate	to	exercise	legitimate	power.	In	this	sense,	
elections	constitute	a	vital	bridge	linking	the	masses	to	the	political	
class	(Ibid:	75).	In	addition,	growing	commitment	to	democratic	elec-
tions	is	also	an	affirmation	of	a	growing	popular	commitment	to	the	
rule	of	law	(Ibid).
To	what	extent	are	these	essential	qualities	of	elections	attainable	
in	Africa?	While	advances	have	been	made	in	the	apparent	competi-
tiveness	of	elections	in	Africa	with	renewed	participation	of	opposi-
tion	parties,	in	few	cases	do	elections	represent	real	opportunities	for	
the	populace	to	determine	who	governs.	Rather,	they	reflect	more	the	
character	of	the	political	order	and	especially	the	degree	of	risk,	in-
cumbents	are	willing	to	tolerate	(Joseph	999:	).	Elections	in	Africa	
have	often	been	staged-managed,	won	before	Election	Day,	rigged	or	
corrupted	and	electoral	verdicts	“stolen”,	which	are	indicative	of	the	
habit	of	holding	regular	elections	without	democratic	culture.	Regular	
elections	therefore	may	not	constitute	enough	grounds	for	postulating	
democratic	consolidation	(Ninsin	006:	6).
In	Africa,	like	in	other	new	democracies,	the	rules	governing	elec-
tions	are	yet	to	be	institutionalized;	and	even	the	most	ordinary	issues,	
such	as	 the	choice	of	Election	Day	and	one’s	position	on	 the	ballot	
paper,	 which	 normally	 should	 be	 decided	 administratively,	 become	
highly	politicized.	The contest	for	power	itself	 is	a	winner	takes	all,	
marked	by	tensions,	acrimony	and	a	vicious	cycle	of	political	distrust	
(Ninsin	995:	66).
Innovative	measures	that	have	been	taken	by	the	various	stake-
holders	over	the	past	fifteen	years	in	Ghana	to	overcome,	or	at	least	
minimize,	these	problems	and	what	hurdles	remain	to	be	surmounted	
form	the	thrust	of	this	paper.	
Brief historical background 
Ghana’s	post	independence	history	began	in	March	957	with	a	liberal	
democratic	rule	which	soon	degenerated	into	a	quasi	dictatorship;	and	
as	a	result,	the	first	military	coup	of	966	(Gyimah-Boadi	000:)	In	the	
subsequent	one	and	half	decades,	Ghana	made	two	other	brief	attempts	
at	liberal	democracy	between	969-97	and	979-9;	but	each	was	
overthrown	 after	 twenty	 seven	months.	 In	 the	 later	 instance,	 Flight	
Lieutenant	Jerry	Rawlings,	who	assumed	the	reigns	of	power	for	a	hun-
dred	and	twelve	days	in	979	and	handed	over	to	the	civilian	adminis-
tration	of	President	Hilla	Limann	and	his	People’s	National	Party(PNP)	
staged	a	comeback	on	the	Christmas	eve	of	9.	The	new	ruling	group,	
the	Provisional	National	Defence	Council	(PNDC),	also	under	Rawlings’	
chairmanship,	in	spite	of	its	name	stuck	to	power	for	eleven	years	until	
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7	January	99	when	Ghana	embarked	on	the	current	experiment	un-
der	the	99	Constitution,	which	is	in	its	fifteenth	year.	
The	PNDC,	unlike	the	various	military	regimes	before	it,	had,	al-
most	from	the	beginning, given	strong	indication	of	wanting	to	stay	
much	longer	in	power.	It	doggedly	refused	to	bind	itself	to	time,	cho-
osing	to	refer	to	itself	and	its	actions	as	part	of	an	indefinite	political	
process	ostensibly	to	implement	the	so-called	participatory,	grassroots	
democracy	that	had	a	disdain	for	multiparty	politics	(Gyimah-Boadi	
99:5).
The transition election of 1992
Against	this	background,	the	PNDC	only	reluctantly	conceded	to	cons-
titutional	rule	under	pressure	from	external	and	domestic	forces,	in	
the	early	990s.	On	the	international	front,	the	pro-democratic	trend	
of	the	post-Cold	War	era	had	begun	to	have	contagious	effect	across	
Africa	(Ninsin	99:4).	Locally,	there	were	persistent	and	increasing	
demands	 from	various	 civil	 society	 groups	 for	 change	 and	political	
reform,	after	nearly	a	decade	of	a	culture	of	silence	under	PNDC	rule.	
The	PNDC	leaders	then	were	unwilling	coverts	that	were	bent	on	en-
suring	that	they	crafted	a	transition	programme	that	would	leave	their	
interest	virtually	intact.	In	addition,	given	its	poor	human	rights	re-
cord	the	PNDC	regime	had	genuine	fears	for	its	physical	security	once	
it	surrendered	power.
The	 incumbent	 regime,	 therefore,	 had	 special	 interest	 in	 the	
outcome	of	 the	 transition	process	and	would	not	 countenance	any	
measures	that	would	prevent	it	from	retaining	power	in	the	new	dis-
pensation.	The	PNDC,	therefore	deliberately	and	carefully	controlled	
the	 transition	 process;	 it	 single-handedly	 chose	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	
99	Constitution	and	the	members	of	the	Interim	National	Electo-
ral	Commission	(NDC)	that	superintended	the	transitional	electoral	
process	in	99.	
As	a	result,	for	the	first	time	in	Ghana’s	political	history	the	leader	
of	the	out-going	military	regime,	Rawlings,	contested	the	presidential	
election,	while	the	ruling	junta,	the	PNDC	metamorphosed	into	a	po-
litical	party,	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	to	provide	him	
with	a	vehicle	for	the	contest.	After	Rawlings	victory	in	the	presiden-
tial	poll,	the	opposition	parties	insisting	it	had	been	rigged	boycotted	
the	subsequent	parliamentary	contest.	
The	 sources	 of	 acrimony	 in	 99	 included	 a	 perceived	 bloated	
electoral	 register,	 the	PNDC	government’s	deliberate	and	systematic	
appropriation	of	state	resources	in	favour	of	the	NDC	(the	use	of	official	
vehicles	for	campaigning,	access	to	state-owned	media;	mobilization	
of	state	apparatus,	etc;	and	suspicion	about	the	INEC	management	of	
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the	elections	(Ninsin	006:64).	The	general	 impression	was	that	 the	
military	government	plotted	to	entrench	its	rule	through	the	backdoor	
provided	by	the	new	democratic	set	up	(Boafo-Arthur	006:6).
Innovations in electoral politics 
From	such	a	slippery	start,	the	strides	that	Ghana	has	taken	in	elec-
toral	politics	since	99	are	 impressive.	Ghana	has	since	held	three	
relatively	peaceful	 and	generally	 acceptable	 elections,	 one	of	which	
led	to	the	alternation	of	power.	Above	all,	from	the	all	time	low	voter	
turnout	of	9%	in	the	99	parliamentary	election	which	the	opposi-
tion	boycotted,	elections	have	been	receiving	between	60%	and	0%	
voter	turnout;	an	indication	of	mass	participation.	
Several	factors	have	accounted	for	this	success	story:	innovative	
constitutional	provisions;	effective	electoral	management	by	the	Elec-
toral	Commission	(EC)	and	related	constitutional	bodies;	consensus	
building	among	political	actors;	the	crucial	roles	of	civil	society	orga-
nizations	and	the	media,	as	well	as	mass	participation	in	the	electoral	
process.	In	the	sub-sections	that	follow	we	discuss	the	major	ones.
Constitutional Provisions
Ghana’s	99	Constitution	made	several	provisions	aimed	at	facilita-
ting	democratic	elections	and	the	implementation	of	those	provisions	
has	contributed	 in	no	 small	measure	 to	Ghana’s	achievements	 thus	
far.	A	few	of	these	would	be	illustrative:	
In	Article		the	rights	to	freedom	of	speech	and	expression,	
freedom	 of	 assembly,	 freedom	 of	 association,	 among	 others	
are	all	guaranteed.	Apart	from	being	useful	in	themselves,	the-
se	 freedoms	 have	 created	 a	 favourable	 environment	 for	 the	
growth	of	 civil	 society	groups	and	political	parties	 that	have	
proved	crucial	for	democratic	consolidation	in	Ghana.
Article	55(5)	provides	that	the	“internal	organization	of	a	politi-
cal	party	shall	conform	to	democratic	principles	and	its	actions	
and	purposes	shall	not	contravene	or	be	inconsistent	with	this	
Constitution	or	any	other	 law”.	As	a	 result	of	 this	provision,	
the	Political	Parties	Law	makes	 it	mandatory	 for	 the	Electo-
ral	Commission	to	supervise	political	party	elections	to	choose	
party	executives	at	the	regional	and	national	levels	as	well	as	
the	choice	of	party	flag-bearers.	This	measure	has	averted	in-
tra-party	conflicts	that	would	have	arisen	over	intra-party	elec-
tion	outcomes.
To	ensure	mass	participation	in	elections	and	politics	in	gene-
ral,	Article	55(0)	preserves	the	right	of	every	citizen	of	voting	
-
-
-
Democratic Innovation in the South
188
age	“to	participate	in	political	activity	intended	to	influence	the	
composition	and	policies	of	Government”.
In	 fairness	 to	both	 the	competing	parties	and	 the	electorate,	
Article	55	(-)	obliges	 the	state	 to	avail	 to	all	presidential	
and	parliamentary	candidates	equal	access	 to	 the	media	and	
as	much	as	possible	ensure	equitable	access	to	the	resources	
necessary	for	ensuring	genuine	competition.
Article	 9	makes	provisions	on	 the	 rights	 of	 disabled	persons	
“who	must	be	protected	against	all	exploitation,	all	regulations	
and	 all	 treatment	 of	 discriminatory,	 abusive	 or	 degrading	 na-
ture”	(Article	9[4]).	The	Electoral	Commission	has	taken	this	
provision	seriously	and	has	introduced	measures	to	enable	the	
disabled	to	participate	fully	in	the	electoral	process.	In	the	004	
elections	a	number	of	disabled	persons	were	employed	as	elec-
tion	monitors	and	more	 significantly,	 the	EC	 introduced	on	a	
pilot	basis	tactile	ballot	to	allow	blind	voters	to	vote	secretly.	Ho-
pefully	this	will	be	introduced	nationwide	in	the	next	election.
Article	6()	provides	that	“there	shall	be	no	impediment	to	
the	establishment	of	private	press	or	media;	and	in	particular,	
there	shall	be	no	law	requiring	any	person	to	obtain	license	as	
prerequisite	to	the	establishment	or	operation	of	a	newspaper,	
journal	or	other	media	 for	mass	communication	or	 informa-
tion”.	This	provision	has	 led	to	the	emergence	of	several	pri-
vate	newspapers,	radio	and	television	station	which	have	been	
playing	vital	roles	during	elections	–providing	education	on	the	
electoral	processes,	monitoring	voting	as	well	as	the	collation	
and	publication	of	results.
Further,	 Article	 6	 provides:	 “All	 state-owned	 media	 shall	
afford	fair	opportunities	and	facilities	for	the	presentation	of	
divergent	views	and	dissenting	opinions”.	Since	996,	Ghana	
Broadcasting	 Corporation	 (for	 both	 its	 radio	 and	 television)	
during	 election	 campaign	 period	 has	 apportioned	 equal	 air	
time	for	presidential	candidates	and	political	parties	to	present	
their	manifestoes.	Similar	provisions	have	also	been	made	in	
the	public	newspapers	like	Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times.
In	 addition	 to	 the	 above	 provisions,	 the	 99	Constitution	made	 it	
mandatory	 for	 the	 establishment,	 through	 Acts	 of	 Parliament	 and	
within	six	months	of	 the	start	of	 the	Fourth	Republic,	a	number	of	
constitutional	 commissions	 that	would	 facilitate	 political	 participa-
tion	in	general	and	the	electoral	process	in	particular.	These	were	the	
-
-
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Electoral	Commission	(EC),	the	Commission	on	Human	Rights	and	
Administrative	Justice	 (CHRAJ),	 the	National	Commission	for	Civic	
Education	(NCCE)	and	the	National	Media	Commission	(NMC). To	
ensure	 their	 independence,	 their	 composition	 and	 functions	 were	
prescribed	in	the	Constitution	(Articles	4,	6,		and	66	respec-
tively)	and	once	appointed,	 they	were	to	be	accountable	only	to	the	
Constitution	(Articles	46,	5,4	and	7	respectively).
Article		provides	among	the	functions	of	CHRAJ,	the	investi-
gation	of	complaints	of	violation	of	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	
and	to	educate	the	public	as	to	human	rights	and	freedoms.	The	NCCE	
in	Article	(d)	is	to	“formulate,	implement	and	oversee	programmes	
intended	 to	 instill	 in	 the	 citizens	of	Ghana	awareness	of	 their	 civic	
responsibilities	and	an	appreciation	of	their	rights	and	obligations	as	
a	free	people”;	among	other	things.	The	NMC,	on	the	one	hand,	is	“to	
ensure	 the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	 the	highest	 journalis-
tic	standards	 in	the	mass	media”,	and	on	the	other,	“to	 insulate	the	
state-owned	media	from	governmental	control”	(Article	67b	&	c).	In	
practice,	these	three	commissions	in	their	respective	ways	have	con-
tributed	positively	to	electoral	politics	in	Ghana.
Thus	 on	 the	 whole,	 Ghana’s	 99	 Constitution	 has	 provided	
broader	avenues	for	political	participation:	Electoral	Commission,	the	
Legislature,	Executive,	Judiciary,	political	parties,	civil	society	organi-
zations,	traditional	institutions	and	the	media	have	all	been	insulated	
from	state	influence.
The Electoral Commission
The	 99	 Constitution	 provided	 for	 a	 seven-member	 Electoral	
Commission	(EC)	consisting	of	a	chairman,	two	deputy	chairmen	and	
four	others	appointed	by	the	President	in	consultation	with	the	Coun-
cil	of	State	(Articles	4	&	70).	Once	appointed	the	Commission	in	the	
performance	of	its	functions,	“shall	not	be	subject	to	the	direction	or	
control	of	any	person	or	authority”	(Article	46).
Article	45	outlines	 the	 functions	of	 the	Electoral	Commission	
which	include	compilation	and	revision	of	the	electoral	register,	de-
marcation	and	revision	of	electoral	boundaries,	conduct	and	super-
vision	of	public	elections	and	referenda,	education	of	citizens	on	the	
electoral	process	and	other	such	functions	that	may	be	prescribed	
by	law.	It	is	thus	the	principal	organ	for	the	administration	of	elec-
tions	in	Ghana
The	performance	of	these	functions	could	be	fraught	with	contro-
versy	which	could	provoke	acrimonious	disputes	due	to	extraneous	or	
extralegal	factors	introduced	in	the	process	either	by	the	state	through	
its	numerous	agents	or	by	contending	political	parties,	their	candidates	
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or	supporters.	Such	interferences	could	severely	compromise	the	role	
of	the	EC	as	an	impartial	referee	and	thereby	throw	into	grave	doubt	
the	credibility	of	the	entire	election.	This	indeed	was	the	fate	that	befell	
the	INEC	which	conducted	the	transition	election	(Ninsin	006:6-6).	
Key	political	actors	and	their	supporters	became	deeply	mistrustful	of	
the	electoral	process	and	the	new	election	authorities	faced	formidable	
challenges	of	building	both	confidence	and	credibility.	
With	the	inauguration	of	the	Fourth	Republic	in	January	99,	the	
life	of	the	largely	discredited	INEC	officially	came	to	an	end	and	a	new	
Electoral	Commission	(EC)	was	inaugurated	in	August	99.	Its	com-
position	and	powers	as	provided	for	in	the	Constitution	were	amplified	
by	statute,	Act	45.	The	existence	of	a	body	of	laws	and	explicit	rules	
and	regulations	provided	the	Electoral	Commission	with	a	measure	of	
insulation	and	put	the	body	in	a	stronger	position	lawfully	to	resist	un-
due	external	pressures	and	interference	in	its	work.	Above	all,	the	laws	
formed	the	framework	for	the	resolution	of	the	electoral	conflicts.
These	changed	circumstances	and	donor	assistance	enabled	the	
EC	to	embark	on	a	comprehensive	programme	of	reforming	the	elec-
toral	process	and	enhancing	credibility.	 Initially,	however,	suspicion	
and	mistrust	of	the	election	authority	as	an	independent	and	impartial	
arbiter	lingered	in	part	because	the	procedure	for	appointing	the	com-
missioners	still	allowed	for	a	significant	degree	of	presidential	influen-
ce	but	more	so	because	a	deputy	chairman,	Dr.	K.	Afari-Gyan	and	a	
commissioner,	David	Kanga,	both	of	the	defunct	INEC	were	‘promo-
ted’	Chairman	and	Deputy	Chairman	respectively	of	the	new	EC.
The	EC	saw	a	clear	need	for	electoral	reforms	with	a	view	to	achie-
ving	greater	transparency	in	all	aspects	of	the	election	process,	seeking	
to	create	popular	faith	in	the	ballot	and	building	confidence	in	the	EC	
itself.	This	coincided	with	 the	need	of	both	 the	government	and	 the	
opposition	 to	achieve	 some	measure	of	 consensus	 if	 the	Fourth	Re-
public	was	not	to	be	derailed.	On	the	part	of	the	government,	the	ex-
ceptionally	low	voter	turnout	of	9	percent	in	the	99	parliamentary	
election	reduced	the	legitimacy	of	the	whole	transition	process	and	for	
the	opposition	parties	there	was	the	fear	that	if	the	stand-off	with	the	
Rawlings	government	remained	unresolved,	the	government	might	sei-
ze	the	opportunity	to	perpetuate	itself	in	power	(Frempong	007:	7)
The	most	 important	mechanism	for	managing	distrust	of	 the	EC	
and	among	the	various	political	parties	was	the	innovative	Inter-Party	
Advisory	Committee	(IPAC)	formed	in	March	994.	The	IPAC	brought	
together	representatives	of	the	political	parties	to	regular	monthly	mee-
	 	 The	 extraneous	 factors	 include	 impersonation,	 double	 voting,	 juvenile	 voting,	
vote-rigging	and	fraud,	and	general	acts	of	manipulation	of	the	voting	process.
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tings	with	the	EC	to	discuss	and	build	consensus	on	contested	electoral	
issues	(Ayee	997:	0).	In	taking	this	step,	the	EC	was	responding	to	a	
recommendation	of	the	Commonwealth	Observer	Group	(COG)	which	
monitored	the	99	elections.	In	its	report,	the	COG	had	emphasized	the	
practical	value	of	dialogue	and	consultation	as	a	building	block	towards	
democratic	consolidation	and	recommended	the	need	to	institutionali-
ze	the	process	of	dialogue,	even	informally,	as	a	forum	at	which	parties	
could	air	their	grievances	(COG	99:	6-6,	cited	in	Ayee	99b:6).
The	IPAC	offered	a	two-way	channel	of	information	for	both	the	EC	
and	the	parties.	It	enabled	the	EC	to	discuss	all	aspects	of	its	program-
mes	and	activities	with	the	parties,	elicit	input	and	address	problems,	
protests	and	disagreements	whenever	they	were	aired.	And	the	parties	
were	able	to	express	their	views	freely	and	openly	about	EC	programmes	
and	activities	and	to	bring	their	concerns	to	the	table.	The	IPAC	process,	
no	doubt,	had	its	hiccups	but	it	succeeded	in	achieving	compromise	so-
lutions	to	such	contested	matters	as	a	single	day	for	both	parliamentary	
and	presidential	elections;	photo	ID	cards,	and	transparent	ballot	boxes;	
and	gained	the	active	involvement	of	the	party	agents	in	the	registration	
exercise	as	observers.	It	also	agreed	on	a	common	date	for	parliamenta-
ry	and	presidential	elections	(Ayee	997:	0).	It	must	also	be	emphasized	
to	the	credit	of	the	EC	that	although	the	IPAC	was	purely	advisory	and	
non-statutory	and	its	decisions	non-binding	of	the	EC,	it	gave	serious	
attention	to	those	decisions	that	were	practical,	legal	and	cost	effective.	
IPAC	then	became	a	framework	for	building	trust	and	confidence	among	
the	political	class	regarding	the	conduct	of	elections	and	provided	a	pla-
tform	for	deepening	trust	with	the	EC	(Ninsin	006:64).
By	996	several	of	the	major	controversial	issues	had	been	resol-
ved	through	the	IPAC	mechanism.	The	positive	dividend	showed	in	the	
996	elections	and	has	continued.	The	voter	turn	out	in	996	was	an	
impressive	7.5%.	The	general	mood	following	the	election	confirmed	
the	fact	that	the	contending	political	leaders	had	agreed	upon	the	basic	
rules	of	electoral	politics	(Ninsin	99:	94).	Unlike	99,	the	defeated	
presidential	candidates	readily	conceded	defeat	and	congratulated	the	
winner	and	he	in	turn	congratulated	the	 losers	for	their	competitive	
spirit.	It	is	therefore	gratifying	that	this	consensus	building	mechanism	
has	been	sustained	and	replicated	at	the	regional	and	district	levels.
The	EC	has	performed	creditably	in	other	areas	as	well:
It	has	asserted	its	independence	on	many	respects	over	the	years:	
In	March	004,	for	example,	when	the	NPP	government	announ-
ced	the	establishment	of	a	national	procurement	committee	to	
undertake	purchases	for	Election	004,	the	EC	contended	that	
that	action	would	undermine	its	independence	and	had	the	plan	
-
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shelved.	Similarly	the	EC	resisted	all	attempts	by	the	opposition	
parties	to	prevent	the	inclusion	of	0	newly-created	constituen-
cies	in	the	conduct	of	Election	004.	The	EC,	conscious	of	the	
fact	that	it	had	operated	within	its	mandate	in	creating	the	new	
constituencies,	maintained	its	stand	until	it	was	confirmed	by	a	
Supreme	Court	decision	(Boafo-Arthur	006:	4).
The	EC	has	taken	even	little	controversies	seriously	and	has	taken	
innovative	measures	to	deal	with	them.	Before	the	000	Election,	
the	position	of	candidates	on	the	ballot	paper	was	in	the	order	in	
which	they	filed	their	nomination.	In	996,	this	had	led	to	a	mad	
rush	among	the	political	parties	to	secure	the	top	spot	on	the	ba-
llot	paper.	In	000,	the	EC	resolved	the	matter	by	the	introduction	
of	balloting	 for	positions	on	 the	ballot	paper	days	after	parties	
have	filed	 their	nominations.	 It	 is	 significant	 to	note	 that	 since	
then	this	method	has	been	replicated	for	intra-party	elections.
The	EC	playing	its	neutral	role	was	equally	mindful	of	the	re-
ligious	dimension.	On	November	4,	000	the	EC	organized	a	
prayer	and	fasting	session	at	the	Conference	Hall	of	the	Com-
mission.	(Agyeman-Duah	00:5).
The	manner	in	which	the	EC	has	collaborated	with	donor	agen-
cies,	political	parties,	 think	tanks,	civil	society	groups	and	the	
media	has	been	most	 impressive.	One	such	collaboration	bet-
ween	the	EC,	IFES,	the	Ghana	Association	of	the	Blind	(GAB)	
and	Action	on	Disability	and	Development	Ghana	(ADD)	in	00	
led	to	the	pilot	test	of	the	tactile	ballot,	earlier	referred	to	(GAB	
Report	00).	Similarly,	since	996,	it	has	accredited	the	domes-
tic	poll	watchers	and	ensured	their	unhindered	access	to	places	
has	boosted	public	confidence	in	the	voting	and	its	outcome.
The	efficient	manner	the	EC	has	been	managing	elections	in	the	
country	is	acclaimed	across	the	electorate.	In	a	post-election	004	sur-
vey	96.%	of	respondents	were	of	the	view	that	the	EC	officials	across	
the	country	applied	the	rules	governing	elections,	were	neutral,	 fair	
and	firm	(Department	of	Political	Science,	University	of	Ghana,	Post-
Election	Field	Survey,	004	cited	in	Boafo-Arthur	006:	7).	This	high	
level	of	confidence	the	electorate	has	placed	in	the	EC	is	the	outcome	
of	the	persistent	efforts	by	the	Commission	to	improve	upon	its	per-
formance.	It	has	within	the	past	one	and	half	decades	initiated	seve-
ral	changes	that	have	greatly	improved	and	enhanced	its	role	in	the	
	 	These	reforms	which	cover	voter	registration	and	election	and	election	material	
management	 include	photo	 identification	 cards	 for	 voters,	unique	 voter	numbers,	
-
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electoral	process	(Boafo-Arthur	006:	).	It	is	therefore,	not	surpri-
sing	that	EC	Chairman	Kwadwo	Afari-Gyan	and	several	of	his	officials	
have	been	involved	in	elections	throughout	Africa	either	as	technical	
facilitators	or	election	observers/monitors.	
The	EC	in	Ghana	has	confirmed	the	fact	that	while	the	success	of	
electoral	politics	depends	on	each	stakeholder	playing	its	assigned	role,	
the	role	of	the	electoral	commission	in	the	process	is	most	crucial.	Apart	
from	neutrality,	the	commission	must	be	fair	and	firm,	to	be	able	to	win	
the	confidence	of	the	contesting	parties	as	well	as	the	electorate.	
The Legislature, Executive and Judiciary
The	traditional	governance	institutions,	the	Legislature,	Executive	and	
the	Judiciary,	have	all	contributed	to	the	success	of	the	electoral	pro-
cess	in	Ghana.	The	Ghanaian	Parliament,	apart	from	the	passage	of	the	
various	acts	establishing	the	EC	and	other	constitutional	commissions	
within	the	constitutionally-mandate	six	months,	has	since	99,	deba-
ted	and	passed	several	constitutional	and	legislative	instruments	broug-
ht	before	it	by	the	EC.	These	instruments	have	facilitated	the	work	of	
the	EC	a	 great	deal.	On	 the	part	 of	 the	 executive,	 both	 the	previous	
NDC	and	the	incumbent	NPP	governments	have,	to	a	large	extent,	sta-
yed	within	the	constitutional	limits	in	their	relations	with	the	electoral	
authorities.	 The	 decision	 of	 the	Rawlings	 government	 to	 respect	 the	
two-term	constitutional	limit	in	000	is	a	case	in	point.	The	role	of	the	
judiciary	has	been	most	beneficial	in	this	respect.	It	has	treated	most	of	
the	election-related	petitions	with	this	dispatch.	Such	cases	included:	
the	fixing	of	the	7	December	Election	Day,	the	controversy	over	the	used	
of	thumb-printed	voter	identification	cards	in	000,	and	the	inclusion	of	
the	thirty	newly-created	constituencies	in	the	004	polls.	
Political Parties
Apart	 from	 elections	 rules	 that	 the	 electoral	 authorities	 impose,	 a	
number	of	normative	and	attitudinal	imperatives	require	compliance	
if	success	is	to	be	achieved.	These	include	tolerance	of	opposing	views,	
free	exchange	and	circulation	of	ideas	and	mutual	respect	among	con-
tending	leaders/candidates	and	their	followers	(Ninsin	006:	6).	It	is	
in	these	respects	that	political	parties,	the	main	political	actors,	have	
contributed	their	quota	to	the	success	of	electoral	politics	in	Ghana.
Through	 their	 involvement	 with	 IPAC	 the	 political	 parties	
reached	 consensus	 on	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 and	 committed	
political	party	agents	observing	voter	registration	and	the	voting	itself,	domestic	elec-
tion	monitoring	by	civil	society	groups,	the	IPAC,	photo	identification	of	voters	on	
electoral	roll,	transparent	ballot	boxes.
-
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themselves	to	upholding	elections	as	the	only	credible	method	
by	which	Ghanaians	would	choose	and	alternate	government	
(Ibid	64).
Since	996	aggrieved	defeated	parliamentary	candidates	have	
resorted	to	the	courts	rather	than	the	streets,	 to	seek	redress	
under	the	law.
Political	parties	in	Ghana	have	pushed	the	consensus	building	
a	step	further	with	the	introduction	of	the	Platform	of	Gene-
ral	Secretaries	and	the	Chairmen’s	Caucus	on	the	initiative	of	
the	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA).	The	Platform,	made	up	
of	political	parties	represented	in	Parliament	came	into	being	
in	 00.	 It	meets	 on	 a	 twice-monthly	 basis	 to	 discuss	 issues	
relating	 to	 party	 programmes	 and	 activities.	 The	Chairmen’s	
Caucus	has	since	004	been	dealing	with	larger	problems	that	
threaten	democratic	consolidation	in	Ghana	(Asante	006:	6)
Since	000,	political	parties	have	formulated	the	Political	Par-
ties	Code	of	Conduct.	 In	004,	 for	example,	at	a	meeting	or-
ganized	by	the	IEA,	representatives	of	registered	political	par-
ties	in	Ghana	formulated	a	Political	Parties	Code	of	Conduct	
(004)	to	regulate	the	conduct	of	political	parties	during	and	
between	elections.	The	Code	stresses	the	democratic	imperati-
ves	of	multipartyism,	mode	of	campaigning,	out-of-campaign	
activities,	measures	for	safeguarding	elections,	etc	(Boafo-Ar-
thur	006:	4).	The	enforcement	of	the	Code	was	a	partnership	
between	the	political	parties,	EC	and	IEA	(IEA	Political	Parties	
Code	of	Conduct	004)
A	significant	contribution	that	these	innovations	by	political	par-
ties	have	made	to	electoral	politics	in	Ghana	is	the	impact	on	the	vo-
ter	turn	out	and,	in	effect,	mass	participation.	From	a	low	of	9%	in	
the	99	polls,	voter	turnout	was	7.%	in	996,	6.7%	in	000	and	
5.%	in	004.	The	consensus	building	among	the	political	elite	has	
created	confidence	among	their	followers	and	this	has	been	manifes-
ted	in	the	sustained	high	voter	turnout.	That	in	itself	underscores	the	
importance	ordinary	Ghanaians,	acting	as	the	electorate,	now	attach	
to	elections.
Civil Society Organizations
Perhaps	 the	most	 innovative	 contributions	 to	Ghana’s	 electoral	 po-
litics	have	come	from	civil	society	organizations	(CSOs)	in	terms	of	
voter	education,	election	observation/monitoring	and	other	strategies	
for	peaceful	elections.	
-
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Voter Education
From	996	civil	society	groups	have	been	very	active	in	the	voter	edu-
cation	efforts:
Human	rights	advocacy	and	policy	think	tanks	like	the	Institute	
of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA)	and	the	Ghana	Center	for	Democra-
tic	Governance	(CDD-Ghana)	have	liaised	with	traditional	civil	
society	bodies	like	the	trade	unions,	business	and	professional	
associations	to	create	formidable	networks	of	private	 institu-
tions	that	have	facilitated	democratic	development	and	redu-
ced	election-related	violence	to	the	minimum	(Gyimah-Boadi	
004:0).	
Publications,	 opinion	 surveys	 and	 studies	 and	 independent	
research	by	the	IEA,	CDD-Ghana,	the	Department	of	Political	
Science	and	 the	School	of	Communications	Studies	 (both	of	
the	University	of	Ghana)	have	also	provided	some	of	the	best	
information	on	politics	and	elections	since	99	(Ibid:	06).
In	the	000	elections,	live	broadcasting	of	public	debates	by	pre-
sidential	candidates,	on	television	and	radio,	was	introduced.	It	
was	organized	by	the	Ghana	Journalist	Association	(GJA)	in	co-
llaboration	with	an	American	NGO,	Freedom	Forum.	The	two-
hour	exercise	involved	five-minute	opening	statements	by	each	
candidate,	a	series	of	questions	from	the	audience	and	another	
five-minute	closing	remark	by	candidates.	This	unprecedented	
experience	enabled	the	electorate	to	assess	further	the	qualities	
of	 the	potential	 presidents;	 it	 brought	 the	new	dimension	of	
giving	voters	the	opportunity	to	judge	candidates	on	the	basis	
of	their	position	on	specific	issues,	introducing	“content”	in	a	
structured	fashion	for	the	first	time	into	Ghanaian	presidential	
campaigns.	(Agyeman-Duah	005:4)
In	004,	the	presidential	debate	of	000	was	repeated.	An	inno-
vation	this	time	was	the	civil	society-sponsored	weekly	televised	
debates	 for	 the	 four	contending	political	parties;	 in	addition,	
the	several	 issues-based	radio	discussion	programs	enhanced	
the	public	discourse.
Also	introduced	in	004	were	CDD-Ghana’s	Public	Forum	and	
IEA’s	Town	Hall	Meeting	for	parliamentary	candidates	in	seve-
ral	constituencies	across	the	country,	at	which	issues	of	public	
interest	(including	education,	health,	HIV/AIDS,	the	economy	
and	national	security)	were	addressed.	(Ibid:	9).	The	consti-
tuencies	were	carefully	chosen	taking	into	consideration	such	
factors	as	the	intensity	of	contest	or	volatility	of	voter	behavio-
-
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ur;	 female	and	 independent	candidacy;	newly-created	consti-
tuencies	and	constituencies	prone	to	violent	conflict.	To	make	
the	 forums	 effective,	 capacity	workshops	were	 organized	 for	
the	participating	candidates	 (CDD-Ghana,	Parliamentary	De-
bates,	004).	The	two	projects	offered	a	common	platform	for	
candidates	to	present	their	programmes	before	the	electorate	
with	the	objective	of	helping	the	candidates	to	focus	their	cam-
paigns	on	issues	relevant	to	the	developmental	needs	of	their	
constituencies	and	the	electorate	to	make	informed	choice.	
Election Observation/Monitoring
Election	observation	in	99	was	dominated	by	international	observer	
groups.	Since	then,	domestic	poll-watchers	have	emerged	and	beco-
me	increasingly	significant.	In	996,	the	two	organizations	that	assu-
med	 this	 role	were	Ghana-Alert,	 the	Network	 of	Domestic	Election	
Observers	(NEDEO),	a	coalition	of		prominent	national	religious,	
professional	 and	 human	 rights	 organizations.4	 The	 advantage	 here	
was	that	the	domestic	groups	could	begin	their	poll	watching	as	early	
as	July	996,	four	months	ahead	of	the	polls.	They	were	thus	better	
placed	than	the	international	observers	to	monitor	developments	be-
fore,	during	and	after	the	voting.	5
For	 the	 000	Elections,	 domestic	 election	monitoring	 assumed	
new	 and	 innovative	 dimensions.	 Several	 local	 groups	 including	 the	
Coalition	of	Domestic	Observers	 (CODEO),	 the	Forum	of	Religious	
Bodies	(FORB),	and	Ghana	Legal	Literacy	Resource	Foundation,	un-
dertook	to	monitor	the	polls	on	an	independent	basis	and	succeeded	
in	recruiting,	training	and	deploying	over	5,000	observers	and	cove-
red	about	half	of	the	over	0,000	polling	stations	nationwide.	
The	domestic	observation	process	in	000	was	far	more	extensi-
ve,	including,	the	general	pre-election	scenario	and	media	coverage	of	
party	political	activities	from	May	to	December	of	the	election	year.	
The	monthly	reports	from	the	monitors	formed	the	basis	of	fo-
rums	where	representatives	of	the	political	parties	and	media	houses	
	 	These	included	the	Commonwealth	Observer	Groups,	African-American	Institute	
and	Jimmy	Cater	Centre.
4	 These	included	the	Christian	Council	of	Ghana,	the	Catholic	Secretariat,	the	Fed-
eration	of	Muslim	Councils,	the	Ahmaddiyya	Muslim	Mission,	Ghana	National	As-
sociation	of	Teachers	 (GNAT),	National	Union	of	Ghana	Students	 (NUGS),	Ghana	
Journalist	Association	(GJA),	Ghana	Association	of	Women	Entrepreneurs	and	the	
Institute	of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA).	
5	 Their	 activities	 included	 the	 training	 of	 election	 monitors	 at	 the	 national,	
regional	and	district	levels	and	the	deployment	of	over	four	thousand	observers	to	
polling	stations	across	the	country	on	Election	Day	(Gyimah-Boadi	999:4).	
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discussed	lapses	and	shortcoming	in	performance	and	worked	out	co-
rrective	measures	(Gyimah-Boadi	00:	65).
 CODEO,	for	example,	selected	twelve	constituencies	deemed	to	
be	potential	flashpoints	for	trouble	from	the	ten	administrative	regions	
of	the	country	where	specially	trained	observers	were	sited	to	monitor	
the	political	environment,	noting	in	particular	the	activities	of	the	EC,	
the	conduct	of	party	primaries,	incidents	of	violence	and	the	use	and	
abuse	of	incumbency	by	the	ruling	party.	The	aim	was	to	publicize	the	
monitors’	report	to	draw	attention	to	infractions	and	irregularities	that	
could	undermine	the	electoral	integrity (Agyeman-Duah	005:5).
Civil	society	support	of	the	004	election	was	even	more	elaborate	
and	extensive.	CODEO,	for	example,	repeated	its	previous	observation/
monitoring	activities6	and	for	the	first	time	monitored	political	party	
primaries	where	parliamentary	candidates	were	selected	(Ibid:	0).
By	their	election	observation/monitoring	activities,	the	civil	CSOs	
have	provided	empirical	basis	 for	all	stakeholders	–the	government,	
opposition,	Parliament,	political	parties,	the	EC,	other	relevant	public	
agencies	and	civil	society–	to	take	measures	to	improve	in	future	elec-
tions	(Ibid:	5).
Strategies for Peace
Other	CSOs	have	focused	on	ensuring	peaceful	and	orderly	elections	
and	have	had	a	moderating	effect	on	the	political	scene	and	reduced	
acrimony	to	a	large	extent	(Ninsin	99:	67).	In	the	run-up	to	the	000	
elections	several	civil	society	groups	were	pivotal	in	reducing	moun-
ting	political	tensions	through	campaigns	for	peace.	For	example,	the	
Musicians	Association	of	Ghana	 (MUSIGA)	organized	musical	 con-
certs	to	promote	peaceful	elections;	while	religious	bodies	held	high	
profile	prayers	for	electoral	peace	and	non-violence.	
Thanks	largely	to	this	relentless	peace-mongering	by	civil	society,	
the	fears	and	anxieties	over	Election	Day	violence,	to	a	large	extent,	
did	not	materialize	(Gyimah-Boadi	00:	66).
Traditional Authorities
Onf	great	importance	to	democratic	consolidation	and	also	innovation	
for	other	countries	in	the	South	to	emulate	the	Ghanaian	experience	
6	 	 It	 launched	a	project	months	before	 the	election	 to	monitor	and	better	publi-
cize	acts	of	political	corruption	falling	under	the	rubric	of	the	abuse	of	incumbency.	
Trained	monitors	observed	the	conduct	of	public	officials	and	candidates	from	Sep-
tember	to	December	004	in	at	least	two	constituencies	in	each	of	the	ten	regions	of	
Ghana;	while	others	tracked	the	daily	news	content	produced	by	four	state-owned	
media	organizations,	including	two	newspapers,	one	radio	station	and	one	television	
network.(CDD-Ghana	Monitors’	Report,	004:)
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is	 the	role	of	 traditional	authorities	 in	promoting	peaceful	elections.	
Article	76	()	of	the	Ghanaian	constitutions	states	that	“a	chief	shall	
not	take	part	in	active	party	politics;	and	any	chief	wishing	to	do	and	
seeking	election	to	Parliament	shall	abdicate	his	stool	or	skin”,	but	that	
has	given	them	the	opportunity	to	play	a	fatherly	and	neutral	role	in	
Ghanaian	politics	since	99.	A	good	example	was	when	various	pro-
minent	traditional	rulers	convened	a	crisis	meeting	with	political	par-
ties	and	the	EC	in	mid-November	000,	and	ended	with	the	adoption	of	
a	-point	resolution	for	violent-free	and	peaceful	elections.	Many	tra-
ditional	rulers	also	took	advantage	of	political	rallies	in	their	localities	
to	appeal	for	free	and	peaceful	elections	(Agyeman-Duah	005:).	
The Media
Fair	and	equal	access	to	the	media	for	all	political	parties	and	their	
candidates	 are	 important	 elements	 for	 leveling	 the	political	playing	
field.	To	help	reduce	if	not	resolve	the	inequalities	in	media	access	and	
coverage	 for	 the	parties	 and	candidates,	 institutions	of	 civil	 society	
groups	have	introduced	workshops	and	seminars	to	sensitize	media	
practitioners	 to	 their	 democratic	 and	 professional	 responsibilities	
(Agyeman-Duah	005:0).
Relaxation	of	media	censorship	since	99	has	also	paved	the	way	
for	 the	 emergence	of	 independent	newspapers	as	well	 as	 radio	and	
television	stations.	The	media	contributed	greatly	to	the	quality	of	the	
electoral	process	in	996.	
The	more	active	presence	of	the	independent	media,	which	pro-
vide	a	constant	stream	of	election	analysis,	has	helped	to	generate	a	
high	degree	of	public	interest	in	elections.	By	providing	channels	of	
discourse	outside	the	state’s	control	and	expressing	opposition	views	
as	well,	the	independent	media	has	been	largely	responsible	for	kee-
ping	elections	competitive	(Gyimah-Boadi	999:44).The	independent	
print	and	electronic	media	have	also	made	it	possible	for	information	
unflattering	to	government	or	not	sanctioned	by	state	authorities	to	
reach	the	public	and	therefore	created	a	balance	in	media	coverage.	
The	role	of	the	electronic	media	in	monitoring	elections	has	been	
unique	and	innovative.	Private	FM	stations	post	their	reporters	coun-
trywide	 to	 give	 live	 reports	 of	 events	 at	 the	 polling	 stations	 and	 at	
collating	centres.	Throughout	Election	Day	stations	are	awashed	with	
reports	of	the	unfolding	balloting	process.	They	inform	electoral	offi-
cials	on	where	to	send	additional	voting	materials	to	alleviate	a	shor-
tage;	the	Police	are	notified	of	potential	and	actual	trouble	spots;	sus-
picious	characters	and	vehicles	at	polling	stations	are	reported	on	air	
including	their	number	plates;	and	ordinary	citizens’	call	on	to	report	
whatever	seems	to	be	irregular	at	the	polling	stations.	
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These	pre-emptive	actions	have	promoted	orderliness	at	the	po-
lling	stations	and	deterred	many	potential	election	fraudsters	and	ri-
ggers	and	have	largely	been	responsible	for	the	high	level	of	transpa-
rency	and	low	level	of	irregularities	recorded	in	the	balloting	process.	
(Agyeman-Duah	005:6)
Media	 reporters,	 who	monitor	 ballot	 counts,	 announce	 results	
live	 from	 the	polling	and	constituency	 collating	 centres	 throughout	
the	country	while	the	operations	desks	at	the	radio	studios	tally	the	
figures	and	give	 the	provisional	 results	of	both	 the	presidential	and	
parliamentary	votes.	Some	stations,	such	as	JOY-FM	of	Accra,	have	
created	websites	where	the	provisional	results	are	posted	as	they	un-
fold.	Thus,	the	Ghanaian	electorate	can	know	the	provisional	outco-
me	of	 elections	before	 the	Electoral	Commission	makes	 the	official	
announcement.
Challenges
Ghana,	however,	 is	no	paradise!	In	spite	of	 its	achievements	several	
hurdles	 remain	 to	 be	 surmounted.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 relations	
between	 incumbent	 President	 John	 Kufuor	 and	 ex-President	 John	
Rawlings	have	not	been	cordial.	Their	personal	differences	run	deeper	
than	the	start	of	the	Kufuor	administration	in	007	but	the	intermit-
tent	attacks	and	counter-attacks	by	these	prominent	politicians,	who	
represent	 the	 faces	of	 the	 two	dominant	political	parties	 in	Ghana,	
have	had	a	negative	repercussion	on	an	otherwise	progressive	deve-
lopment	 in	 electoral	 politics.	 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 the	 recent	mediatory	
step	by	retired	UN	Secretary	General	Kofi	Annan	would	yield	fruitful	
results	ahead	of	Election	00	
Another	threat	is	that	Ghana’s	democratic	progress	has	been	pa-
ralleled	by	increased	ethnicity.	Particularly	since	000,	elections	have	
been	 shaped	 by	 the	 Akan	 –Non-Akan	 divide.	 The	 ruling	 NPP	 has	
gained	most	of	its	votes	from	the	five	Akan	regions	while	it	has	perfor-
med	poorly	in	four	Non-Akan	regions;	and	for	the	opposition	NDC	the	
reverse	has	been	the	case.	The	only	exception	here	is	the	cosmopolitan	
Greater	 Accra	Region,	which	 though	 traditionally	Non-Akan,	 voted	
7	 	Kufour	as	a	Local	Government	Minister	in	the	Rawlings-led	PNDC	had	resigned	
following	the	brutal	murder	of	three	judges	and	an	ex-military	officer	in	which	gov-
ernment	functionaries	were	implicated.	Since	then	there	have	been	no	love	lost	be-
tween	them.
	 	Nearly	half	 the	Ghanaian	population	belongs	 to	 the	broad	Akan	ethnic	group	
which	is	geographically	spread	across	five	of	the	ten	regions	–	Ashanti,	Brong	Ahafo,	
Central,	Eastern	and	Western.	The	other	ethnic	groups	covering	the	remaining	five	
regions	–	Greater	Accra,	Northern,	Upper	East,	Upper	West,	and	Volta	–	are	loosely	
called	‘Non-Akan’	in	this	context.
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for	the	NPP,	not	least	because,	majority	of	the	people	there	are	Akans.	
The	sad	aspect	is	that	the	people	of	Central	Region	who	had	not	voted	
along	ethnic	lines	were	ridiculed	rather	than	hailed.
The	frequency	of	boycotting	of	parliamentary	sessions	by	oppo-
sition	groups	casts	doubts	on	how	deeply	the	political	elite	have	im-
bibed	the	ethos	of	consensus	building.	While	in	opposition	the	NPP	
had	boycotted	parliament	over	issues	like	vetting	of	presidential	mi-
nisterial	nominees	and	the	budget.	The	current	opposition	NDC	had	
continued	and	deepened	the	boycott	 ‘tradition’.	Issues	 like,	national	
reconciliation,	national	health	 insurance,	extension	of	 the	 franchise	
to	Ghanaians	abroad,	 and	 the	 conviction	of	one	of	 its	members	by	
a	court	of	law,	have	all	attracted	boycotts	by	the	NDC	parliamentary	
caucus.
In	spite	of	the	several	measures	aimed	at	leveling	the	playing	field	
electoral	resources	remain	skewed	in	favour	of	incumbency;	the	996	
and	004	election	campaigns	in	particular	demonstrated	the	affluence	
of	 incumbency	 and	 the	penury	of	 opposition.	The	 intriguing	point,	
however,	as	Election	000	amply	demonstrated,	is	that	incumbency	is	
not	always	an	advantage.	Could	Election	00	produce	another	alter-
nation	of	power?	
Deepening	 citizens	 understanding	 of	 the	 electoral	 system	 and	
management	and	educating	them	on	their	civic	responsibilities	is	yet	
another	challenge.	Although	Ghanaians	appear	 to	be	generally	con-
versant	with	their	civic	responsibilities	and	are	highly	committed	to	
democracy,	evidence	from	election	observations	indicates	high	levels	
of	 ignorance	about	 the	 laws,	procedures	and	processes	of	elections.	
As	a	result,	corrupt	voting	practices	are	rampant	and	pointless	argu-
ments	provoke	conflicts	and	at	times	violence.	There	are	indications	
that	 election-related	 violence	 results,	 in	part,	 from	 indiscipline	 that	
is	engendered	by	those	who	believe	that	the	opening	of	the	democra-
tic	space	gives	unbound	freedom	of	expression	and	action.	(Baffour	
Agyeman-Duah	005:9).
Isolated	 cases	 of	 election-related	 violence	 have	 broken	 out	 be-
fore,	during	and	after	elections	in	Ghana.	In	000,	the	post-election	
violence	 in	Bawku,	 the	Upper	East	 regional	capital	was	a	 test	case;	
and	in	004,	there	were	episodes	of	violence	in	Tamale,	the	Northern	
Regional	capital.	The	arrest	and	subsequent	death	in	military	custody	
of	Alhaji	Mobila,	the	Regional	Chairman	of	the	Convention	People’s	
Party	(CPP)	was	perhaps	the	darkest	spot	in	the	004	elections.	There	
were	also	incidents	of	attacks	on	electoral	officers	and	the	burning	of	
ballot	materials	as	well.
Though	Article	54	of	the	99	Constitution	charged	the	adminis-
trative	expenses	of	the	EC	on	the	Consolidated	Fund,	in	practice,	the	
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EC	like	other	constitutional	commissions,	has	been	consistently	sub-
jected	to	government	budgetary	cuts,	with	serious	implications	for	its	
efficiency,	effectiveness	and	independence.
Closely	related,	the	most	successful	innovations,	whether	by	the	
EC,	the	political	parties	or	civil	society,	have	been	over-dependent	on	
donor	funding9;	and	that	raises	doubt	about	sustainability	when	such	
funds	dry	up.	The	frequency	of	meetings	of	IPAC	and	other	political	
party-related	 bodies	 have	 been	 constrained	by	 availability	 of	 donor	
funds	in-between	elections.
There	are	still	 some	flaws	 in	 the	EC’s	conduct	of	elections.	For	
example,	the	004	voter	registration	exercise	was	somewhat	marred	
by	conflicting	directives	 from	 the	EC	and	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	
related	photo-taking	exercise	was	conducted	gave	critics	the	chance	
to	allege	that	the	EC	had	favoured	the	incumbent	party	in	its	electoral	
stronghold	of	the	Ashanti	Region.
Conclusion
This	 post	mortem	of	 electoral	 politics	 in	Ghana	 has	 demonstrated	
how	 the	country	has	 responded	 to	 liberal	democracy	over	 the	past	
fifteen	 years.	While	Ghana	has	witnessed	 a	 revolution	 through	 the	
ballot	the	ballot	box	since	its	return	too	constitutional	rule	in	99,	
there	are	still	problems	of	institution-building;	inclusion,	accommo-
dation	and	compromise;	incumbency;	and	ownership	of	the	electoral	
process,	 to	 grapple	with.	 In	 both	 its	 successes	 and	 challenges,	 the	
Ghanaian	experience	provides	useful	lessons	for	the	emerging	demo-
cracies	in	the	South.	
First,	Ghana	has	demonstrated	that	national	constitutions	in	the	
South	must	 provide	 the	 bedrock	 for	 establishing	 independent	 elec-
toral	bodies	free	to	adopt	innovates	ideas	in	the	management	of	the	
electoral	process.
Second,	innovation	in	the	electoral	process	is	essential	for	demo-
cratic	consolidation.	Such	innovations,	however,	must	be	the	collec-
tive	 responsibility	of	 all	 stakeholders	 –	 government	and	opposition,	
political	parties,	civil	 society,	 the	media,	 traditional	authorities,	etc.	
Not	only	should	innovations	take	the	socio-cultural	context	into	con-
sideration	but	also	they	should	be	seen	as	an	ongoing	process	which	
must	evolve	over	time	time.	
9	 	 The	 major	 donors	 include	 the	 Department	 for	 International	 Development	
(DFID)	Canadian	International	Development	Agency	(CIDA),	the	Danish	Interna-
tional	Development	Agency	(DANIDA),	International	Federation	of	Electoral	Sys-
tems	(IFES),	Friedrich	Ebert	Foundation	(FES)	and	the	United	States	International	
Development	Aid	
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Third,	the	practice	of	dialogue	and	consultation	among	political	
parties	 through	an	 intra-party	consultative	mechanism	is	an	 impor-
tant	building	block	in	ensuring	peace	in	electoral	politics.	
Fourth,	even	a	flawed	transition	can	set	the	stage	for	democratic	pro-
gress	if	all	the	stakeholders	would	effectively	play	their	respective	roles.
Lastly,	free	and	fair	elections	as	well	as	peaceful	transfer	of	power	
are	possible	 in	Africa	and	such	good	practices	 should	be	published	
and	publicized.
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